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Lying on a makeshift cot, buried in layers of tattered 
blankets, a child quietly whimpers, worn down almost 
completely by the disease which his parents have neither 
the remedy nor the money to relieve him of. Although this 
scene may seem more appropriately set in a third world 
nation such as Bolivia or Laos, it is equally well-suited 
to the Bronx NY or “Little Town" USA. Despite spending 
nearly eight billion dollars on health care last year, the 
U.S. is far from “First World*1 when it comes to medicine.
The problem with the U.S. health care system stems not 
from a lack of adequate medical resources, as evidenced by 
the eight million spent last year, but rather a lack of 
structure and guidance to the American health care “beast”. 
As a result, the “beast** is in some instances nearly 
flawless but at others dismally pathetic. The strong 
points of the U.S. include one of the world's highest 
levels of medical technology and hospitals that are highly 
capital intensive. In contrast, then, the weaknesses of 
the system become even more shocking. With all this high- 
powered medical technology, the U.S. find** itself with 
literally millions of its citizens who receive little or no 
medical care. Moreover, the number of those receiving 
inadequate medical care is growing rather than decreasing.
2The major problems with U.S. health care can be divided 
into four categories; inequality in medical care, 
escalating health care costs, inadequacy of long term care 
facilities, and catastrophic health care expenditures.
The aforementioned symptoms of the U.S. health care 
system, after being more carefully defined, will form the 
basis for analyzing the various proposals aimed at 
remedying the system. These reform measures can be broadly 
be divided into two categories. The first encompasses 
governmental attempts at reform of the Medicaid and 
Medicare systems and proposals for regulation of the health 
care providers. These measures usually involve either 
expanding the coverage of the "Medi-insurance" programs or 
increasing governmental, preferably federal, control or 
guidance over major health care providers so as to insure a 
more desirable health care product. The second group of 
reforms calls for a fusion of government and free- 
enterprise. These plans call for Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMO's) and Preferred Provider Organizations 
(PPO's) to provide health care as a policy tool of 
government. These organizations could provide government 
scrutinized health care to the welfare population in return 
for government reimbursement. In order to gauge the 
effectiveness of these numerous proposals, however, it is
3necessary to first outline the four problem-criteria11 
which necessarily define the success of any proposed 
reforms.
Eiskififii ill ears far ihs. Poor
Perhaps the most disturbing and most critical flaw in 
the U.S. health care system involves the great inequality 
in its distribution throughout the population..
Undeniably, health care is spread unevenly throughout the 
country with regard to income, geography, and race. 
Moreover, these discrepancies are directly related to 
sources of medical care available to certain sub-groups of 
the general population. While the rich can afford top rate 
medical attention, the poor must rely on the few sources 
available. Moreover, those few sources serving the poor are 
increasingly suffering economic hardships that jeopardize 
their ability to help the poor.
The inequality in disbursement can be witnessed by 
several criteria. For example, in a 1977 survey by the 
National Canter for Health Services Research, it was 
discovered that approximately seventeen percent of the 
people living in the western United States had no usual 
source of health care, while only eleven percent of those 
living in the north central U.S. fell into the same
4category. Moreover, the same study found that seventy-two 
percent of those person* living in the north central 
section of the United States recognize a physician's office 
as their primary source of health care, while less than 
sixty percent of those living in the western states were 
similarly categorized (1). While these differences may at 
least be partially offset by other factors such as 
population concentration, and regional preferences, other 
statistics reveal more serious defects in the U.S. health 
care system.
When analyzing health care data based on income level, 
the inadequacies quickly become apparent. For example the 
infant mortality rate for families with an estimated income 
greater than five thousand dollars per year is 4.9 deaths 
for every one thousand live births. In contrast, for 
families with estimated annual earning less than five 
thousand dollars, the infant mortality rate jumps to 7.8 
deaths per one thousand live births (2). Furthermore, 
surviving the first obstacle is truly just the beginning: 
the average poverty-line child has had 3.3 visits to 
a doctor per year compared to a non-poverty child's 4.2 
visits on average. In a study done by H. Luft, it was 
discovered that while on average a white male aged eighteen 
to thirty-four with an income in excess of ten thousand
5dollars has a .46 percent chance of becoming severely 
disabled, the chances increase to 1.15 percent for white 
males of the same age group but with annual incomes less 
than ten thousand dollars (3) 4 These statistics are but a 
smattering of the wide body of data that correlate the 
negative relationship between income and level of health 
care received. While the link between health and income 
may be unsettling enough when considered alone, when 
pondering the fact that as of 1984 thirty-six percent of 
all black families fall below the poverty line, the added 
stigma of racial inequality creates an even more 
disheartening effect (4).
Before condemning the U.S. health care system, however, 
it is first necessary to ascertain if the health care 
received by the poor is truly significantly quantitatively 
or qualitatively inferior to that received by the rest of 
the population or if their poor health is rather a symptom 
of diet or lifestyle. The most logical starting point for 
this query would then be to delineate access to health care 
based on income class. Access can be defined as "those 
dimensions which describe the potential and actual entry of 
a given population group into the health care system" (5), 
This analysis is appropriate in that regardless of actual 
outcome, if the poor truly have equal access to the health
6care system, the system is fulfilling its function.
Limited Access for the Poor
Even by this criteria however, the U.S. health care 
system fall short. In a 1977 NCHSR study, established that 
approximately 17.1 percent of persons with an income less 
than twelve thousand had no usual source of health care.
In contrast, the same category applied to only 12.2 
percent of those persons earning in excess of twenty 
thousand dollars a year (6). Granted, there can be several 
explanations for claiming no "source of care"; 
such explanations included "does not get sick", "new to 
area", and "sources no longer available." The evidence, 
however, indicated that there are restrictions on the 
availability of health care to the poor. First, of 
a population of approximately of two hundred and twenty 
million people, more than twenty two million have no health 
insurance, private or public, to reimburse their health 
care costs. This group consists mainly of the "working 
poor"; persons ineligible for Medicaid yet too poor to 
afford such necessities as health insurance. This lack of 
health insurance undoubtedly limits the health care 
channels that are left open to such people. (It is hard to 
refute the argument that most doctors are unwilling to take 
patients who do not have sufficient funds to pay for their
7services.) Secondly, the previously mentioned NCHSR study 
also noted inequitable trends i:, health care. Of those 
with incomes less than twelve thousand dollars, fifteen 
percent indicated that their usual source of health care 
was either a hospital outpatient department, an emergency 
room, or a health clinic, while only 58.4 percent of this 
same group stated that a physician's office was their 
primary source of health care. In stark contrast, the 
study revealed that 8.3 percent of those earning more than 
twenty thousand dollars claimed that their primary source 
of health care was either a hospital outpatient facility or 
a public health clinic, with an additional 69.7 percent 
declaring that a physician's office was their usual source 
of care (7). Further to the point, a 1977 survey by the 
Cincinnatti Department of Health ascertained that only 
twenty percent of the surveyed office-based physicians were 
willing to take on new Medicaid clients. Conversely, 
seventy-four percent of the same group were prepared to 
accept new non-Mcdicaid clients (8). Additionally, a 1980 
study by the New York City Health Department observed that 
only thirty^two percent of all licensed physicians in New 
York City actually participated in the Medicaid program to 
any extent (9). The distinction between the usual sources 
of medical care for these two groups is critically relevant
8in determining the relative quality received by each.
There are few people who wouldn't prefer to be treated in a 
doctor's office rather than an outpatient facility or 
community health clinic.
Preferences don't deceive. The advantages of office- 
based treatment over the other mentioned sources are 
numerous. First, being treated by one physician over a 
period of time guarantees consistency and uniformity in 
medical service whereas emergency rooms and health clinics 
are staffed by a variety of doctors who frequently move 
from place to place. Secondly, emergency rooms, outpatient 
facilities, and public clinics tend to dehumanize the 
relationship between doctor and patient and prevent the 
patient from feeling comfortable and secure. In the 
doctor's office, however, the one-on-one relationship 
between doctor and patient and the privacy afforded 
patients allows them to become more relaxed and at ease 
with the office environment. Lastly the quality of the 
physicians found in places such as public clinics is far 
below that found in a general practioners office. This 
because facilities such as outpatient departments and 
emergency rooms are usually staffed by interns who are much 
less seasoned and skilled than their office-based counter 
parts. Clearly then, the inequality in access to health
9care is a significant problem that threatens to severely 
diminish the quality of life enjoyed by the poorer persons 
of this country. Before moving on to discuss the problems 
associated with cost containment in the medical industry, 
it is first necessary to take a brief overview of those 
hospitals that do serve the poor- the health clinics and 
public hospitals.
Befalls Hospitals
There has been a trend through the last decade for a 
growing number of private hospitals to refuse to admit 
patients who are either Medicaid recipients, or worse yet, 
patients who have no reliable sources to pay for their 
treatment (10). This trend is a result of hospitals trying 
to cope both with escalating medical costs and the ever 
increasing burden of indigent patients. For this reason, 
health clinics and especially public hospitals have been 
taking an increasingly larger share of the burden in caring 
for Medicaid recipients and indigents. A significant 
number of these hospital have an average of over forty 
percent of their patients who are either unable to pay or 
are Medicare/Medicaid beneficiaries. The economic hardship 
placed upon the hospital by those unable to pay is quite 
easy to see. Studies by government agencies such as the 
Congressional Budget Office and the Department of Health
and Human Services indicate that hospitals serving a 
substantial number of Medicaid/Medicare patients (over 
twenty percent) incur significantly higher costs (12). 
Neither report could pinpoint the exact reasons for this 
phenomena, but proposed as plausible explanations: 1) the 
higher severity of illness for low income patients, and 2) 
higher operations and overhead costs due to the special 
needs of the poor and elderly, and as a result of the 
location of these hospitals (13). Further to the detriment 
of these hospitals, many experts in the health care field 
feel that it is very difficult for hospitals to pass these 
added costs on to paying customers (14). As a result of 
this problem and because public hospitals and clinics are 
in general poorly administered, these institutions have 
come under extreme financial pressure in the past decade, 
forcing a considerable number to close down. Thus, the 
dire straits faced by many of America's poor becomes all 
too evident when one considers the deteriorating position 
of their already limited health care alternatives.
Er.Qb.lejB ill health Cage Cost: Containment 
An equally distressing problem that afflicts all 
Americans alike is the incredible explosion of health care 
expenditures that has occurred over the last twenty years.
During this period, health care expenditures have increased 
at a rate that greatly outpaced the overall rate of 
inflation. For example, over the last twenty-five years, 
1960-1985, health care costs have increased by 
approximately thirteen percent a year- an average well 
above the general rate of inflation for any single year 
during that span (15). An even more shocking statistic is 
the increasingly large share of the U.S.'s Gross National 
Product that is being gobbled up by health care 
expenditures. In 1960, health care expenditures consumed
5.3 percent of the nation's GNP, by 1983 they had 
enveloped a 10.7 percent slice of the economic pie (16).
Not only does this trend reflect a seemingly unconscious 
shift in the nation's utilization of its resources, but 
also threatens to jeopardize the solvency of the federal 
and state health care aid programs. Government 
expenditures, both state and federal, have expanded from
6.3 billion dollars in 1973 to more than thirty billion 
dollars in 1983 despite a modest decrease in the number of 
people receiving aid. By most estimates, if government 
expenditures continue to grow at this rate, and there is 
little reason to doubt that they will, the federal Medicare 
program and Medicaid trust will be completely exhausted by 
the early 1990's unless other significant sources of
12
funding are found (18). Perhaps most frightening, however, 
is the knowledge that this explosion has taken place amidst 
a furious barrage of governmental activity aimed at 
arresting the problem. Unfortunately, for both government 
and consumer, the roots of the problem are complicated and 
numerous. Although the problem is far from being clearly 
understood, it may be helpful to outline the most popular 
professed causes that have been set forth.
gauges of E m ?ndj,tyre Increase
l3shnfllp.gyjL
The first and most apparent contributor to the 
expenditure boom has been the rapid development of medical 
technology. Only a decade ago terms such as CAT scan and 
laser surgery were words foreign to medicine. The 
development and application of such tools has meant that 
hospitals have had to undertake tremendous capital 
expenditures. For example, the Swan Catheter, a high-tech 
medical instrument developed at the beginning of this 
decade was fully implemented into most hospitals by 1984 
and added approximately three hundred million dollars a 
year to the nation's health care bill (19). There is no 
doubt that these advances in medical technology have saved 
countless lives: what has been questioned, however is to
what extent and at what cost these advances should be 
introduced into the health care system. Truly, no one 
would place a price on a human life but real world 
conditions constrain the amount of resources available for 
human consumption. A dollar spent on health care is a 
dollar that can not be spent on food, shelter, or 
transportation. It is simply necessary to apply cost- 
benefit analysis to determine if gains in made in medical 
gains justify setbacks caused by resource transfers from 
other fields. This is not a proposal to completely halt 
medical research; rather it is a question of degree. Every 
hospital should have X-ray equipment; there is no debate. 
Whether every hospital needs CAT scan technology and 
advanced coronary care units is another question. Yet when 
considering that CAT scan equipment which can cost as much 
as one hundred thousand dollars, and is only infrequently 
used, one must dispute the wisdom of hospital 
administrators who make such equipment standard capital. 
Instead of cooperating with other area hospitals in 
planning capital procurement, most hospital administrators 
seem intent upon developing advanced care units and 
purchasing the latest medical technology so as to create a 
more marketable “medical package'* than that of their 
nearest "rival." Such practises have contributed greatly
14
to the upward spiral of health care expenditures.
Consumer Preference:
A second and equally responsible factor has been the 
fantastic increase in the use of the health care system. 
This growth is not solely a result of population growth, 
but is also a consequence of a greater medical turnover 
rate. More simply put, people are going to the doctor more 
often. The reasons for this augmented turnover rate are 
several. First, Americans have evolved into a highly 
health conscious society. Not only is it considered 
important to exercise and diet, but also to see a doctor 
regularly for a checkup and to utilize the latest in 
medical technology and technique, people are becoming more 
confident in the competence of medical personnel. Only a 
few decades ago it was considered a bit risky to check into 
the hospital unless it was absolutely necessary. Now, 
although the hospital is anything but perfectly safe, 
medical standards have risen to such a level that many are 
willing to go to the hospital for even minor ailments. 
Lastly, and possibly most responsible has been the 
evolution of comprehensive health insurance policies.
These policies, which cover almost any imaginable medical 
expense, requiring only a minimal payment on the consumer's 
part, have created a great incentive for people to over­
utilize medical resources. Thus, by requiring little or no 
payment on the consumer's part, the insurance companies 
drastically reduce his/her marginal cost to purchase 
medical services. Thus, the consumer is likely to make 
many more trips to his private physician than if he had to 
pay for each such visit out of his own pocket. Clearly, no 
one group can be tagged with the blame for increased use of 
medical resources, nor is it necessarily a completely 
negative phenomena? rather it is a complex problem that 
must be approached on many fronts.
Monopolistic Health Care Markets:
A third and related cause of "health care inflation" is 
the structure of the health care market. Instead of the 
consumer purchasing services directly from the provider, he 
does so indirectly through an insurance company. The 
problem with this arrangement is that no where in the 
system are there any checks to restrain unnecessary price 
increases. If the consumer were to deal directly with the 
provider, he would have incentives to take such steps to 
constrain price increase as to choose the lowest cost 
provider or to reduce health care expenditures as much as 
rationality and common sense would allow. In contrast, 
health insurance have little incentive to keep health care 
costs down. They have neither the manpower nor the will to
16
investigate individual claims. If medical costs rise, they 
can simply pass these added costs on to the policy holder. 
Assuming that these costs rise uniformly across the 
country, all insurance companies will face roughly the same 
cost curve and will not suffer any loss in business as 
consumers will have little choice but to endure the 
increase in premiums. As far as the hospitals are 
concerned, so long as there is no tangible penalty, it is 
considerably easier to be efficient than it is to be 
efficient. Thus, it should be quite evident that the 
health care reimbursement system contains serious flaws 
that if left unchecked will continue to add to health care 
cost inflation.
Malpractice Sujtg:
Less significant but nonetheless important in the 
upward climb of medical costs has been the proliferation of 
malpractice suits. A product of the 1970's and 1980's, 
malpractice suits have become such a common occurrence that 
insurance to guard against such suits have sky-rocketed to 
unbelievable levels. For surgeons, premiums have gone as 
high a sixty thousand dollars a yea.v. Thus, in order to 
maintain their present standard of living, doctors must 
pass these increased costs on to consumers. Although this 
is a problem that must be dealt with by lawmakers rather
17
than hospital administrators, it remains a factor 
contributing to the explosion of health care expenditures.
All of these factors in addition to many other that 
have gone unmentioned combine to make cost containment a 
problem both difficult to understand and difficult to solve 
State and federal governments have instituted policies such 
as capital investment restrictions and alternate 
reimbursement policies but met with limited success. Even 
major insurers such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield have 
become more aggressive in negotiating contracts with 
providers- gaining only marginal success. There simply is 
no easy solution. Unless the problem of cost containment 
is come to grips with soon, however, health care 
expenditures could become a cancer that virtually consumes 
all of our nation's resources.
EcabJjBlB i l l  Lorn Tirm .Cats io x  the E lderly
Perhaps the most embarrassing if not serious health 
care issue stems from the pitiful manner in which the 
elderly are provided for upon retirement. The historian 
Toynbee concluded that a society's quality and durability 
can best be measured by the respect and care it gives to 
its elderly citizens (20). If Toynbee was right, then the 
U.S. might appropriately be compared to a Yugo brand
automobile. One of the most terrifying thoughts to most 
senior citizens is to exhaust one's life savings, to lose 
support of their children, and to become unable to take 
care of themselves. In this situation the federal and 
state governments offer two alternatives; either go to a 
nursing home (Medicaid, with some restrictions, picks up 
the bill), or go it alone. Considering that the average 
life expectancy once enrolled in a nursing home is three 
years, neither choice is particularly exciting (21) . It 
is shameful that, although the elderly are statistically 
the most likely to need medical attention, our society 
does so little to provide for their care. The problems 
with long term care for the elderly are two fold: 1) 
problems in finance and organization of public programs, 
and 2) the inadequacy of nursing homes as the primary 
source of long term care for the elderly.
Problems in Organization and Finance:
Government organization and planning for long term 
health care of the elderly is best described as ad hoc.
There is no formal agency assigned to the specific task of 
over seeing this topic. Rather most state and federal 
payments to nursing homes are funded by state Medicaid 
programs. This is a strange arrangement as Medicare was 
originally intended to care for the elderly. However,
18
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since the elderly must literally become poor to receive 
government aid for nursing home care, they fall under 
Medicaid's jurisdiction. Moreover, unlike most other 
health care sectors, health insurance providing long term 
care are a somewhat scarce and unknown commodity. With 
little help from the government or from private insurers, 
the elderly is often forced to turn to their own resources 
and the resources of their families.
Lamentably, the government does not see their families 
as equal alternatives to nursing homes. For while Medicaid 
will fully reimburse nursing homes, it fails, in many 
cases, to cover many out-of-pocket costs such as medicine 
and physical aides that are not directly related to 
physician's visits. Although it may at first seem perverse 
to pay a family to care for its parents, consider the added 
economic hardship incurred by a family in providing 
professional nursing and other medical services to an added 
family member. Moreover, ask yourself which family is more 
caring, one willing to devote its time and resources to 
caring for its parents or one that prefers to send its 
parents off to a sterile and dehumanizing nursing home. 
Although a few states do provide dependency stipends to 
families who provide home care to the elderly, these 
allowances rarely meet costs associated with caring for the
20
individual. Few families, therefore, have this choice to 
make because government does not significantly help them in 
caring for their elders. Moreover, Medicare fails to meet 
many of the out-of-pocket medical expenses that the self- 
sufficient elderly make. The elderly, more than any other 
segment of the population, are in need of a constant flow 
of medical services. In contrast, Medicare coverage is 
anything but complete? covering only major expenditures 
such as hospitalization and physician's office visits.
Thus it is not uncommon for elderly persons with incomes 
less than five thousand dollars spending large percentages 
of their income on medical care (22). By one estimate, the 
overall out-of-pocket expenditures of the elderly amounted 
to fifteen percent of their total income in 1985 and is 
expected to grow to nineteen percent by 1990 (23). By 
lilting aid to the elderly and their families who care for 
them, the government forsakes many elderly to a lifestyle 
only marginally better than that of nursing home.
To compound this problem financing these already 
restrictive government programs will grow even more 
difficult in the coming years. From 1960-1982, the 
percentage of the U.S. population aged sixty-five or 
greater grew from 9.2 percent to 16.7 percent. Moreover, 
the proportion of this elderly population over seventy-four
21
years of age increased from one-fourth to one-third during 
the same period (24). This trend is likely to continue 
through the year 2000 as the "baby boom" generation edges 
toward retirement. With an ever increasing proportion of 
the population reaching retirement age and living longer, 
the tax burden on the working ranks may grow to unbearable 
levels. Therefore unless the government's long term care 
program for the elderly is drastically revamped, the system 
faces a coming financial crisis that could threaten its 
solvency.
Nursing Hsmgs
The second major flaw in the present long term care 
system for the elderly derives from the primary providers 
of this service, the nursing homes. Perhaps the epitome of 
everything that has gone wrong with the long term care for 
the elderly, a large number of nursing homes are 
characterized by living conditions more appropriate for 
people of a backward third world nation than of a wealthy 
industrial state. In Too Old, Too Sick. Too Bad. Frank 
Moss characterizes the common complaints against nursing 
homes as: negligence leading to injury and death, 
unsanitary conditions, poor food and poor preparation, 
misappropriation and theft of patients possessions by 
employees, inadequate control of drugs, unauthorized and
22
improper use of restraints, and reprisals against those who 
complain (25). Moss goes on to cite countless case after 
case, recounting incidents where patients were either 
negligently or intentionally severely injured by their 
supposed "caretakers." The fact that eighty percent of 
those who enter a nursing home will perish there in less 
than two and a half years only underscores the poor 
conditions that exist in many nursing homes (26). Granted 
many who enter nursing homes are old and in poor health, a 
group with short life expectancies, but a sizeable number 
of those persons entering nursing homes are quite healthy 
but simply lack the mobility to lead a normal life and have 
no where else to turn. The severity of this problem is 
compounded by the fact that are not a choice among 
alternatives, but are the only choice for many elderly. 
Furthermore, although not all nursing homes fit this 
stereotype, ninety-two percent of all nursing home beds are 
filled; so getting into a "good" nursing home may require 
putting one's name on a waiting list that is two years 
long- time that many elderly do not have (27). Thus, many 
elderly are put in the unenviable position of either caring 
for themselves in their declining years or of suffering tie 
conditions of a nursing home.
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Problem #4: Catastrophic Medical Costs 
The newest and most threatening dilemma confronting 
the vast majority of people is a side-effect of medicine's 
brightest gains. Catastrophic health care costs have risen 
to the forefront of the health care debate in the late 
1970's and early 1980's due in part to the great rate of 
technological advance in the medical field. As technique.; 
and technologies were developed to treat formerly incurable 
ailments, the cost associated with these new operations 
rose commensurate with the level of sophistication 
involved. This process has continued to the point where 
the cost of certain medical services can literally bankrupt 
a family. For example, a Congressional Budget Office 
report established that nine percent of all U.S. families 
would sustain catastrophic health care expenditures in a 
given year (28). Before actually delving into the breadth 
of the catastrophic cost problem, however, it might first 
be helpful to define just what is meant by the term 
'■catastrophic health care expenditures."
Catastrophic Expenditures Defined;
The most important distinction to be made is between 
catastrophic health care expenditures and high-cost health 
care expenditures. Whereas1, the term "high-cost1* denotes 
a fixed if not arbitrary value, catastrophic expendi ures
24
are defined by an individual's ability to pay. Therefore, 
expenditures exceeding fifteen percen: of annual income, 
for example, may be considered catastrophic. The 
importance of this distinction can be seen when comparing 
the impact of a five hundred dollar medical bill on a 
family with a yearly gross income of five thousand dollars 
to its impact on a family with a fifty thousand dollar a 
year income. Quite clearly the former family will have a 
difficult time paying the bill while the other will have no 
problem whatsoever. Not surprisingly the aforementioned
C.B.O. study observed that families with an income less 
than five thousand dollars had a twenty-eight percent 
chance of incurring catastrophic medical expenses, while 
only .2 percent of families with incomes exceeding twenty 
thousand dollars were likely to be victimized by such 
costs (29). (The study took into account the offsetting 
effect of public and private insurance policies.
Nonetheless, the poor are not the only group at risk of 
being subjected to such expenses. Those people who earn 
moderate incomes but, for one reason or another, can't 
realistically afford comprehensive health insurance and 
those, regardless of income level, who fail to perceive the 
potential threat of catastrophic ’osts, are also in serious 
jeopardy of losing their lif s savings. Moreover, many
insurance policies discontinue coverage after a pre­
determined maximum reimbursement has been exhausted. The 
diverse nature of those people at exposed to the 
potentiality of suffering catastrophic medical expenses 
makes the coordination of a national program to meet this 
problem all the more difficult.
Truly, the various definitions of catastrophic, 
depending upon what income group is being assessed, makes 
development of an all-encompassing plan nearly impossible. 
Private insurers could not be involved in a broad-based 
plan since the cost of insuring is inversely proportional 
to the insures's income. More concretely, a poor family 
may find costs exceeding five hundred dollars catastrophic, 
necessitating higher premiums than for a family that could 
sustain substantially higher drains on its financial 
resources. Thus, since those who are least able to pay 
require the greatest coverage, insurers, barring government 
subsidization, would have no choice but to discriminate in 
issuing policies. Aside from obvious political pressures, 
the federal government would encounter serious 
administrative problems with a reimbursement system based 
on the fluctuating level of people's incomes. Moreover, 
considering the magnitude of some catastrophic med.i<\U 
costs, the government would fall into financing
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difficulties unless it significantly increased the tax 
burden borne by the middle and upper income groups- a 
highly unpopular proposition. Thus, because "catastrophic 
medical costs1 means different things to different people, 
creation of a non-exclusive plan is a goal not easily met.
Government Policy Options
After analyzing the four major problem areas of the 
health care field, it is now necessary to survey those 
policy options, both implemented and proposed, open to the 
federal government to combat these problems. In keeping 
with the structure of the introductory section, government 
policy options will be discussed as they apply to the four 
problem criteria. Therefore, under the heading of cost 
containment, government policies of Certificate-of-Need 
requirements, Prospective Reimbursement, and enforced 
competitive bidding will be highlighted. Second, a section 
will be devoted to the various legislative proposals at 
expanding Medicare and Medicaid coverage to include 
comprehensive long term care for the elderly. One of the 
most dynamic topics of the 1980's, medical care for the 
poor, will be discussed in the context of the Hill- Burt on 
Act and the mandatory insurance program proposed by Senator 
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. Last, catastrophic health
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care costs, an equally controversial topic, is presently 
being addressed by the proposed Stark-Waxman Bill.
Saygrpmant Attempts at Cast gentalnroent 
One of the hottest health care issues of the 1970's 
was containing rapidly expanding health care costs.
Although health care costs had been running at a higher 
rate than the general level of price increases, the severe 
inflation that characterized the economic climate of the 
1970's made these medical expenditure increases even more 
unbearable. Unlike many other health care issues, 
government was well-suited to tackle cost containment 
because minimal revenue expenditures were needed to 
confront the problem. The two major policy tools that were 
used by the government Certificate-of-Need (CON) regulation 
and Prospective Reimbursement, have met with moderate 
success but contain some potentially serious disadvantages. 
A third alternative available to the government, one 
implemented only on a marginal scale, is to compel 
competitive bidding in health care provider service 
contracts. These three policies illustrate the three 
avenues open to government control; expenditure control, 
price regulation, and anti-monopolistic measures.
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Certificate-of-Need Rggyjreinents
The Certificate-of-Need requirement originates from 
the National Health Planning and Resource Development Act 
of 1974. The National Health Planning Act (NHP) made 
federal health planning subsidies (Medicare and Medicaid 
funding) and certain other grants contingent upon a state's 
adoption of mandatory certificate-of-need review for 
capital expenditures exceeding $150,000 and for any 
increases in types of services offered or changes in bed 
capacity (30). The enactment of the NHP was in response to 
the inability of the hospitals to voluntarily restrain 
expenditures. Although a few states had drafted CON laws 
before 1974, the NHP gave impetus for all states, with 
exception of Alabama, to enact CON legislation by 1980.
The results of empirical studies done on the 
effectiveness of CON laws have been mixed. CON laws have 
been effective in slowing the growth of capital 
expenditures. Furthermore, state government agencies have 
been able to steer capital expenditures into those hospital 
programs deemed most useful to the population in general.
On the other hand, however, CON laws have done little to 
slow the overall growth of medical expenditures. While 
state agencies have influenced some investment decisions, 
the great majority- ninety percent of expenditure requests-
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were approved as submitted (31). Despite the fact that 
CON's are intended to restrict expansion of hospital 
capacity, they have done little to reduce the excess 
capacity that already exists. Moreover, to circumvent this 
restriction on capacity expansion, hospitals have countered 
by increasing the capital concentration per bed unit by 
investing in capital not restricted by CON regulations and 
by increasing covered capital investments in increments 
below the CON review floor. Thus, although CON laws have 
been effective in restricting some types of inefficient 
capital formation, they have not sufficiently stemmed 
capital leakages to prevent the continuing explosion of 
medical expenditures.
A second and more recent option tried by the federal 
government has been the introduction of Prospective 
Reimbursement. Whereas Certificate-of-Need laws attempt to 
control costs by restricting hospital expenditures, 
Prospective Reimbursement attacks the problem directly by 
regulating the price of medical services purchased by the 
government. As 42.4 percent of all health care 
expenditures are made by the public sector, the federal 
government possesses considerable bargaining power when 
negotiating with individual hospitals (32). Therefore, in
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1984 Medicare changed the manner by which it reimbursed 
hospitals for medical services provided to its 
beneficiaries. Instead of accepting whatever charges that 
the hospital billed it, Medicare began dictating what rates 
it was willing to pay for various medical services. This 
policy was developed when Medicare authorities discovered 
that Medicare was paying medical fees that were varying by 
as much as five hundred percent for identical operations. 
Medicare officials created a system of reimbursement 
centered on diagnosis related groups. Each diagnosis 
related group (DRG) represents a collection of medical 
services considered of equal value based on the amount of 
time and sophistication involved. In all, Medicare has 
designated four hundred and sixty-eight DRG's that 
encompass nearly all services provided by hospitals. As 
Medicare is one of the single most important consumers of 
medical services, most hospitals have reluctantly accepted 
the tenants of Prospective Reimbursement.
Since being enacted, Prospective Reimbursement seems 
to be relatively successful in controlling "medical 
inflation." Even though not all the success can be 
credited to Prospective Reimbursement, in the two years 
following its enactment the growth rate of medical 
expenditures declined from 18.5 percent annually in 1983 to
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5.5 percent annually in 1985 (33), Yet another statistic, 
a reduction in the average length of a hospital st< y from
9.3 days in 1983 to 7.7 days in 985, is cited as ample 
evidence that padding of medical fees has been 
significantly reduced by Prospective Reimbursement (34).
Unfortunately, Prospective Reimbursement is not 
without its problems also. Most obvious is the fact that 
under different circumstances, the same operation may 
indeed vary in cost. For example, urban medical services 
are notorious for being more costly to provide because of 
the density nature of the hospital's location.
Furthermore, it is only logical that some operations will 
develop complications while others proceed routinely- yet 
it is obvious that more service is delivered in the former 
instance than the latter. Clearly, by assigning pre­
determined and sometimes arbitrary values to generic 
medical services, the system fails to accurately compensate 
the provider.
A second and related criticism of Prospective 
Reimbursement involves the incentives that pre-determined 
rates give to hospitals. There have been numerous 
complaints that unscrupulous hospitals release Medicare 
patients prematurely and in general provide substandard 
service in a discriminatory manner to Medicare patients
(35). The rationale is simple: by skimping on service to 
Medicare patients, the hospital retains more of DRG fee in 
the form of profits. Medicare has tried to combat this 
trend by forming Peer Review Organizations (PRO) to act as 
private "watchdogs", but discrimination against Medicare 
patients still remains a serious problem. 
coerced Competitive EiMinai
A third choice left available to government policy 
makers is to attempt to reduce the extent to which 
hospitals exercise monopoly power as suppliers of medical 
services. By coercing competitive bidding among providers 
to serve major insurers, policy makers would hope that the 
interaction of supply and demand could restrict price 
increases to more realistic levels. Thus such large firms 
as Blue Cross, Kaiser-Permantente, and state Medicaid 
agencies would have the advantage of negotiating 
aggressively with providers. Conversely, at present, most 
hospitals refuse to negotiate comprehensive rate schedules 
with private insurers. Although the federal government has 
never instituted such a program mandating gcod faith 
bargaining, states such as Arizona and California have 
approved such programs and met with surprising success(36). 
For such a program to be instituted on the federal level 
would require overcoming a substantial hospital lobby that
would put up a vehement battle. Whether a nationally based 
pini\ would be successful or not remains unanswered, but 
experience from many state programs is very encouraging as 
at least a partial solution to the problem.
yavnuumilfc Efiiigyi Lom Care for the Elderly
In contrast to the containment of health care 
expenditures, a policy issue readily addressed by 
regulatory devices, the dilemma of providing long term 
health care to the elderly seems a problem unamenable to 
government manipulation. While cost control could be 
approached via non-revenue depleting measures, long term 
health care provision would require large scale spending 
increases by government- a highly unpopular idea in the 
eyes of most U.S. Congressman. At the crux of the problem 
is the fact that few people, for whatever reason, make 
plans to provide for long term nursing and medical services 
needed in their old age.
Most indicative of this tendency is the fact that 
nearly three out of every four elderly persons believe that 
Medicare covers nursing home costs (37). Because of this 
widely held misconception, many elderly find themselves 
entering nursing homes without any way of meeting the 
average yearly price tag of $22,000 (38). Although the
phrase "long term health care" also includes in-house 
nursing, this type of care is not as problematic because 
for the most part it is financed by relatives and friends. 
When it does become problematic is when in-home nursing 
costs become too great a financial burden on the family and 
forces the elderly person into a nursing home. The two 
policy alternatives available to government administrators, 
therefore are; 1) provide government assistance to pay for 
elderly nursing home care, or 2) create incentives for 
friends and relatives of the elderly to provide in-home 
nursing care.
Medicaid: Spending Down
The first aforementioned alternative, that of 
financing nursing home care out of government revenues is 
the most often cited remedy, but also the most vehemently 
opposed. Under the present system, Medicare, the federally 
sponsored assistance program for the elderly, covers 
approximately only two percent of nursing home costs (39). 
Thus, the only alternative left to many elderly is to 
"spend down" in order to qualify for state Medicaid 
assistance which will cover most nursing home expenses. 
Unfortunately, however, state Medicaid programs require 
that eligible recipients have no more than on average 
$2,700 in liquid assets and allow the non-institutionalized
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spouse only an average of $240 in income per month to live 
on (40). The travesty in this process is that not only 
must the institutionalized individual exhaust all his 
savings, but his spouse must adjust to living on less than 
three thousand dollars a year- hardly sufficient to provide 
the bare necessities.
BfiMBaC BUI 1HB 2 4 3 6 1
In order to address this short coming therefore, two 
major subsidization bills have been recently introduced.
The first ind most radical was proposed by U.S. Rep. Claude 
Pepper (D. Fla.). Pepper's bill (HR 3436) calls for 
expansion of Medicare benefits to provide comprehensive 
reimbursement for nursing home care and for in-home care. 
This bill which is presently being debated in the House, 
has met stiff opposition for two principal reasons. First, 
the actual cost of such a program is likely to cost twenty- 
four billion dollars over a five year span (41). The 
relative cost of such a program is staggering when 
considering that it benefits slightly more than one million 
of the twenty-seven million present Medicare 
beneficiaries (42). The second point of opposition derives 
from the fact that in order to finance this program taxes 
would have to be increased through an elimination of the 
present cap on income subject to the Medicare payroll tax.
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Clearly, while Pepper's bill would solve the long term 
health care problem, it would do so at a cost that 
completely offsets any benefit.
Waxro^-SQhMiner Bill IHB 12111
A second proposal, the Waxman-Schumer bill (HR 1711), 
confronts the narrower problem of the impoverishment of the 
non-institutionalized spouse. Proponents of the bill feel 
that although it is not too much to ask the 
Medicare/Medicaid recipient to exhaust his funds in an 
effort to obtain long term health care, there is little 
justification in limiting the recipient's spouse to an 
income below the poverty level. The Waxman-Schumer bill, 
therefore proposes that the minimum needs allowance for the 
spouse be expanded from its present $240 per month to $925 
per month. Furthermore, the bill would allow the spouse to 
retain one-half of the couple's remaining income if rent or 
mortgage minus utilities exceed one-third of this $925 
needs allowance. Moreover, the spouse would also be able 
to keep up to twelve thousand dollars in liquid assets 
(43). Simply put the Waxman-Schumer bill is designed to 
relieve some financial burden from the spouse of a nursing 
home patient. (These benefits only apply to long term 
care, i.e. nursing homes, and are intended to compliment 
the Stark-Waxman bill which provides comprehensive Medicare
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coverage for all medical expenses except long term care.) 
Although the Waxman-Schumer bill, which is presently before 
Congress, does help relieve some pressures of long term 
health care, it is only a first step and must be followed 
with more comprehensive reforms to completely deal with the 
problem. One problem with any future reforms of a 
comprehensive nature, however, is that they will require 
substantial funding; something that is unlikely to bode 
well with the present budget conscious Congress.
Soyegninent incentives fog In-Home Care
A second angle of attack for policy makers, one which 
has received little attention, is to provide tax incentives 
to those relatives and friends who finance home health care 
for the elderly. While one may feel that relatives have an 
obligation to support their elders in their old age, one 
must realize that these people are providing a positive 
externality by keeping the elderly off of the Medicaid 
rolls and therefore reducing costs borne by society. Few 
families, however, can afford the long run cost of 
providing twenty-four hour-a-day nursing services for an 
elderly relative. Because it is less expensive to provide 
this care at home than institutionally, it is societally 
desirable that a greater number of elderly are cared for at 
home. To correct this "externality" therefore, it is
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necessary to give the home providers economic incentives to 
render more of this service to the elderly. By granting 
tax incentives to these families, the government can avoid 
actually increasing revenue expenditures while still 
providing adequate incentives. What remains to be seen is 
if the number of nursing home enrollees dependent on 
Medicaid can actually be cut and to what extent tax 
incentives must be granted to bring about the desired 
results. Truly, this proposal, while offering potential 
solutions to the problem, has many basic assumptions that 
remain to be proven.
fiftYgcnment £uhsi<iissd, Health care fsr thz Poor 
Undeniably the health care problem most urgently in need of 
improvement is the problem of providing medical services 
for the poor. While many elderly must endure great 
hardshipr to obtain long term health care, many of the poor 
have little or no access to health care. The Medicaid 
system, which is administered on the state level and funded 
by equal contributions from federal and state sources, is 
designed to aid the poor in obtaining health care. State 
Medicaid plans have relatively restrictive eligibility 
requirements. The most common eligibility criteria is that 
the potential recipient qualify for AFDC (Aid to Dependent 
Families with Children) benefits. To qualify for AFDC the
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individual must be a member of a family that has an income 
that is classified as being below the poverty line. 
Furthermore, one-half of the states exclude two parent 
families from eligibility, while all states require that at 
least one parent be unemployed. Not only do these 
requirements exclude many families, but they also provide 
undesirable incentives to the poor. Not suprisingly, only 
fourty-five percent of those of those persons living below 
the poverty line actually receive Medicaid benefits. This 
compares to sixty-five percent of this group which received 
Medicaid benefits only a decade ago (44). Perhaps most 
responsible for this trend is the fact that while the 
actual poverty line has moved up as a result of inflation, 
few states have revised their statuatory poverty line to 
compensate for inflation. Thus, as a result of these 
restrictive policies, in 1988 there were thirty-seven 
million Americans who had no health insurance, public or 
private (45). To meet this crisis, the federal government 
has drafted three major pieces of legislation, th^ Hill- 
Burton Act, the "disproprtionate share1* clause of the 198 3 
TEFRA amendment, and the recently proposed Kennedy bill. 
Hill-Burton Ast
The Hill-burton Act which dates back to 1946, has gone 
through many facelifts before arriving in its 1988 form.
40
The basic thrust of the Hill-Burton Act, as it stands 
today, is to require hospitals and other health care 
facilities to provide uncompensated health care to those 
persons unable to pay for them. Hill-Burton defines 
uncompensated services as "services made at no charge or at 
reduced charges" (46). Any health facilities that 
"received grants, or loans for construction, modernization, 
or equipment" from government sources are required to 
participate in Hill-Burton (47). What Hill-Burton does is 
to mandate that participating health facilities provide an 
annual amount of uncompensated services that is determined 
by the amount of federal aid that they received. Thus, a 
hospital must provide an annual amount of uncompensated 
services equal to the lesser of: 1) ten percent of federal 
assistance received, or 2) three percent of operating costs 
minus Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. Furthermore, 
these services must be provided for twenty years following 
the completion of the financed project or until the loan is 
repaid, whichever is longer (48). Moreover, to insure that 
their quota for uncompensated service is met, hospitals 
must take active measures to notify eligible persons of its 
availability. Those persons that are eligible are defined 
as: 1) not being covered by a third party insurer or 
government program, 2) earning an income not more than
double the National Poverty Income guidelines, and 3) 
request services within the facility's allocation program 
(49). The design of the program, therefore, is government 
provision of subsidies to hospitals to insure that the poor 
are accorded some access to health care.
While Hill-Burton is successful in guaranteeing some 
health care for the poor, it falls short of arresting the 
indigent care problem because of two flaws.. First, most 
hospitals have alternative sources of finance and can avoid 
Hill-Burton restrictions all together if they so choose. 
Although most hospitals do receive some form of government 
assistance, they can seek outside sources of capital to 
minimize their Hill-Burton obligation. Because of these 
outside sources, Hill-Burton has been unable to create the 
impact its draftees had envisioned. Second, Hill-Burton 
misfires because it has no mechanism to accurately control 
the amount of aid going to the poor. Rather, the hospitals 
control how much aid will be given to the poor. By 
choosing the amount of aid that they want to accept from 
the federal government, hospitals are in effect deciding 
how much aid will be given to the poor. Since Hill-Burton 
aid is arbitrary and bears little relation to the needs of 
the poor, it can not be used as an effective tool for 
meeting their medical needs. Thus, Hill-Burton is
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successful as a stop-gap measure in guaranteeing limited 
access of the poor to health care but fall short of truly 
addressing the problem of opening health care access to the 
poor.
PisjacpgpctiQftatg Share
A second measure enacted to lessen the plight of the 
poor was the "disproportionate share" clause of the 1983 
TEFRA (Tax Equity and liscal Responsibility Act) act. It 
had long been argued that serving poor patients entailed 
significantly higher costs than for the average patient. 
This argument followed from the fact that on average poor 
patients arrive in worse physical condition 
because of their lower living standards and because they 
wait longer before seeking medical assistance due to their 
limited financial means. Therefore, the poor usually 
require more extensive treatment and take longer to recover 
from their illness. While serving a few welfare patients 
places no real burden on a hospital, enrolling a great 
number of them can drain the financial resources of a 
hospital. As a result, hospitals located in urban areas 
and which had patient bases consisting of greater than 
thirty percent welfare patients were suffering severe 
financial strains, some on the verge of closing. To 
relieve some of the burden, the federal government enacted
the "disproportionate share" clause which stated that any 
facility serving a disproportionate share of the welfare 
population was entitled to a higher reimbursement schedule 
to compensate for the added cost of serving a great number 
of welfare patients. Although many independent 
studies indicate that patient mixes exceeding twenty-five 
to thirty percent welfare patients inflict inordinate costs 
on the providing facility, the Department of Health and 
Human Services has been unable to develop a satisfactory 
definition of "disproportionate" and has therefore stalled 
the implementation of the clause (50). This prevision does 
stand to improve the plight of the poor, but unless the 
Department of Health and Human services quits dragging its 
heels, the clause may never be effectively implemented. 
Ksnnefly kill IS 12£5I
The third and most promising reform put forth is the 
proposed Kennedy bill, drafted by Senator Edward Kennedy 
(D. Mass.). Of the thirty-seven million Americans without 
any form of health insurance in 1988, twenty-three million 
were employed or dependents of those in the workplace (51). 
Senator Kennedy's bill (S 1265) focuses on aiding the 
working poor by requiring employers to provide health 
insurance for all adult employees who work at least 
seventeen and one-half hours a week. Employees would be
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required to pay at least eighty percent of the premium 
unless the worker earned less than one hundred and twenty- 
five percent of the poverty line, in which case the 
employer would be responsible for the entire premium. 
Furthermore, the health policy would have to cover at least 
eighty percent of all hospital expenses and would also have 
to have a catastrophic provision that limits out-of-pocket 
expenses to three thousand dollars a year (52). To 
increase the efficiency of the program , regional pools of 
small businesses would be created to purchase group plans 
and reduce administrative overhead costs« Clearly the 
effect of such a program would be to substantially and 
effectively reduce the number of uninsured Americans.
Like any policy proposal, however, Kennedy's bill is 
not without its negative aspects. The first and most 
obvious drawback of such a plan is its large price tag.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that such a plan 
will cost American business about 27.1 billion a year but 
offsets, including three billion in high-cost individual 
insurance policies that workers would drop as a result of 
this legislation, would reduce the net cost of the program 
to approximately fifteen billion dollars annually (53). A 
second complaint is that as a result of the added cost of 
health insurance, which would cost about fifty-two cents
per hour for a full time worker, nearly one hundred 
thousand jobs would be lost. Although the Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that most of the dislocated worker 
would eventually find work elsewhere, there is no doubt 
that this would greatly disrupt the economy„ Moreover, 
this added cost to employers would at least partially be 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices 
thus initiating potentially inflationary conditions.
Lastly the bill would disproportionately fall on the 
shoulders of small business. While all U.S. firms with 
five hundred or more employees offer their some form of 
health insurance plan to their workers, only forty-two 
percent of those firm: with nine or less employees provide 
insurance to their workers (54). Even though the bill 
calls for a gradual phase in period to alleviate some of 
the burden on the smaller businesses, opponents claim that 
such an added cost will cripple many small firms.
In analyzing the overall merit of the Kennedy bill, 
one must be left with a positive impression. First it 
seems quite capable of opening health care access to a 
large proportion of the population that is presently poor 
and uninsured. Secondly, it accomplishes its goal with 
minimal government administrative entanglement, and with 
minimal involvement of government revenues. There can be
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little doubt that this plan will lay an added burden on the 
economy, but one cannot expect to provide health insurance 
for twenty-three million people without paying a 
substantial sum of money. Clearly, this bill comes closer 
to solving the health care problems of the poor than any 
other recently proposed alternatives; what is necessary is 
for Congress to become committed to solving this problem 
and to enact legislation such as that proposed by Senator 
Kennedy. At present, however, the economic recovery of the 
U.S. seems to be Congress's preoccupation and therefore the 
future of Senator Kennedy's bill looks dim.
SataatEQBtug M&fljLsal costs 
The last problem criteria set forth, catastrophic 
medical costs, is one which Congress, for the most part, 
has wholeheartedly refused to address. The reason that 
Congress has been so opposed to assuming responsibility for 
this problem is that Congress would most likely have to 
institute a national health insurance plan to fully 
abate the problem. There are several reasons why the idea 
of national health insurance is highly unpopular on Capitol 
Hill. First, the insurance lobby is an extremely effective 
lobby that could apply heavy pressure to defeat such a 
proposal. Second, although many studies have indicated
that Americans strongly favor a national health insurance 
program, eighty-three percent are covered by a private 
insurance policy and therefore are not likely to become 
actively involved in a push for such a reform (55).
Lastly, but most importantly, financing a national health 
insurance plan, one comprehensive enough to cover 
catastrophic expenses, would require a substantial tax 
increase. In a time of severe government budget 
difficulties, Congress is unlikely to institute a tax hike 
simply to fund a national health insurance program.
Instead of setting up such a comprehensive program,
Congress has chosen to approach the problem on a 
significantly smaller scale, in an ad hoc manner. The 
result of this policy has been that legislators have chosen 
to provide aid to only those groups in most dire need of 
catastrophic healtn insurance, principally the poor and the 
elderly. Until recently there had been little Congressioi al 
action on the subject, but with the introduction of the 
Stark-Waxman bill (HR 2470), the scent of reform is once 
again in the air.
Itedlgar.s
Before explaining the changes posited by Stark-Waxman, 
it is first necessary to briefly explain huw the present 
Medicare plan is designed. Medicare is divided into two
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halves, Part A and Part B. Part A covers hospitalization 
and skilled nursing (not nursing home) expenses and is 
provided free of charge to all Medicare beneficiaries.
Part B is optional and requires the payment of a small 
yearly premium. The services covered under Part B include 
reimbursement of eighty percent of all covered physician 
and outpatient charges after the beneficiary has met a 
seventy-five dollar deductible (56). The Stark-Waxman bill 
proposes changes that would greatly alter both sections of 
the Medicare program.
StagKrWaxffian bill
Part A reforms include changes in coverage of both 
hospital inpatient services and skilled nursing services. 
Under present Part A guidelines, Medicare covers one 
hundred percent of the first sixty days of hospitalization 
except for a five hundred and twenty dollar deductible. 
After the first sixty days, the percentage of costs covered 
gradually declines until after one hundred and fifty days 
Medicare ceases coverage. Under Stark-Waxman, the 
beneficiary would only be required to pay an initial 
deductible and would then receive one hundred percent 
coverage of all inpatient services for 365 days a year 
(57). Moreover, under Part A, skilled nursing costs are 
covered for one hundred days with the beneficiary paying
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approximately fifteen percent of the costs from day twenty 
until day ore hundred and fifty, after which he must assume 
all of the costs* The proposed reforms would expand 
coverage to one hundred and fifty days and require the 
beneficiary to pay fifteen percent of the costs for the 
first ten days only.
Of the two major reforms to Part B of the Medicare 
plan, the proposal involving out-of-pocket costs is the 
most radical. Under current Med.care law, there is no 
limit to the amount of out-of-pocket expenses that the 
beneficiary must pay. Stark-Waxman would install a $2030 
cap on covered Part B services. After the beneficiary had 
paid $2030 in out-of-pocket expenses for covered Part B 
services, Medicare would pay one hundred percent of all 
additional covered expenses (58) • Secondly, while Medicare 
presently only covers eighty percent of costs of 
immunosuppressive drugs for organ transplant patients, 
Stark-Waxman would phase in over a five year period a 
measure that would cover eighty percent of all outpatient 
drug expenses after a six hundred dollar deductible was 
met.
Unlike many other health care reform bills, Stark- 
Waxman is considered to be "revenue-neutral. *• That is to 
say, Stark-Waxman would not add any financial strains to
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the federal budget. It would be completely financed out of 
premium increases paid by Medicare beneficiaries. The 
House version of the bill would require an estimated forty 
percent of participants to pay a mandatory "supplemental 
premium” which would rise with income to a maximum of 
around $580 per year for 1988. The Part B premium would 
increase by twelve dollars a year, with an additional 
increase of about twenty-eight dollars per year for the 
drug benefits (59). The opponents of Stark-Waxman complain 
that there is no provision to cover long term health care, 
in particular, nursing home care. In response to this 
criticism the previously mentioned Pepper bill and Waxman- 
Schumer bill have been offered as compliments to 
Stark-Waxman. As it is, Stark-Waxman has passed both 
houses of Congress and is presently before a joint 
conference committee in an attempt to resolve the 
differences between each house's version of the bill. 
Stark-Waxman while not confronting the problem of 
catastrophic costs on a general basis, will provide 
protection from catastrophic costs for the nation's 
elderly- a first step down a long road.
Health Malntanangg. Organ isations ;
After examining some of the major policy options open
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to the federal government, both proposed and practised, a 
look a those alternatives offered by the private sector 
will complete the spectrum of viable remedies to the U.S.'s 
health care woes. During the last twenty to thirty years, 
the greatest advances in health care organization have come 
from the private sector. Greatly slowed by government 
lethargy, the private sector has propelled its two major 
organizational innovations, the Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) and the Preferred Provider Organization 
(PPO), into the forefront of the health care debate. 
Although still foreign terms to many Americans, HMO's and 
PPO's have, since the late 1970's and continuing through 
the present, gained an increasingly large share of the 
health care market. Before moving on to a discussion of 
the past successes and future prospects of HMO's and PPO's, 
it is first necessary to define just what they are, and how 
they differ from each other. 
ami Defined
The older of the two organizational forms and 
presently the most popular is the Health Maintenance 
Organization. The origins of the HMO date back to the 
Kaiser-Permantente Foundation created in 1946 (60). The 
Permantente Foundation was the successor to Kaiser 
industry's prepaid employee health care plan. Kaiser's
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health plan had been so successful and had expanded to such 
a degree that in 1946 it was opened to the general public 
as the Permantente Foundation. Although it never gained a 
significant share of the insurance market, Kaiser- 
Permantente remained a relatively successful venture.
The basic organizational characteristics of an HMO are 
actually quite simple. The first important 
characteristic, and the one that sets HMO's apart from all 
other health care insurers, is that it is set up on a 
capitation system rather than a fee-for-service basis.
More simply put, members of a* :!M0 pay one yearly premium 
and all subsequent medical services are free of charge. 
Moreover, instead of being reimbursed on a per service 
basis, physicians are salaried relative to the number of 
patients tnat they serve.
An equally important characteristic of the HMO is the 
manner in which it negotiates with staff physicians to 
assure that the costs to the consumer are kept low while 
quality is preserved. The major problem with the existing 
health care market is that the suppliers, the hospitals and 
physicians, have monopoly power. With the emergence of 
large HMO's, however, health care providers can be made to 
bargain with consumers on an equal basis. Furthermore, 
HMO's have the time and resources to obtain information
53
regarding the prices and qualifications of the entire field 
of health care providers. This further enhances the 
position of the consumer, as few individuals have the 
resources to accurately discriminate among the various 
health care providers.
The last, but nonetheless the most critical, 
characteristic of an HMO is the manner in which management 
approaches policy objectives. As HMO's are for-profit 
institutions and must compete against rival HMO's for 
members, they have strong incentives to keep premiums at 
a minimum while maintaining a reputation for excellence in 
service. In order to perpetuate this balance, management 
gives physicians incentives to keep excess costs and 
unnecessary services to a minimum. Although this may at 
first seem as if management is cutting back on service, 
this not so. Doctor's are notorious for tacking unneeded 
services and hospital days on to a patient's bill so as to 
earn more money. Moreover, the HMO has sufficient 
incentives not to cut significantly into quality of care, 
the thriat of a fall in membership coupled with numerous 
malpractice suits serves that purpose,
EESli Dsllnsd
Preferred Provider Organizations are in many ways
54
similar to HMO's but differ on some important points. A 
more recent innovation, the first true PPO was developed in 
Colorado in 1980 (61). The PPO has risen as a viable 
alternative to not only traditional fee-for-service health 
care, but also to HMO's. There are five basic 
characteristics which distinguish PPO's from other 
institutions (62). First, every PPO has a provider panel 
of selected physicians and hospitals contracted to serve 
PPO members. The PPO searches for the most cost efficient 
providers and then negotiates strenuously to obtain the 
lowest rates for its members. Secondly, whereas HMO 
physicians are more strongly associated with the HMO 
organization, PPO physicians are unattached doctors who 
simply contract services to a given number of PPO members 
are therefore not truly part of the PPO organization. 
Moreover, PPO physicians are reimbursed on a fee-for- 
service payment system. This contrasts with HMO doctors who 
are in effect salaried employees of the HMO. Thirdly, PPO 
are not restricted to PPO providers in seeking medical 
services. If they choose, PPO members are free to solicit 
treatment from non-PPO physicians. However to encourage 
member use of PPO physicians, the PPO does create 
incentives toward that end. Thus, while all services 
provided by PPO doctors are completely covered, services
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provided by non-PPO doctors are reimbursed only to the fee 
level that PPO doctors are paid. Therefore, if an outside 
provider charges fifty dollars for an office visit but the 
PPO providers have contracted that service for twenty-five 
dollars a visit, the member must pay twenty-five dollars 
out of his own pocket. The fourth characteristic, a 
characteristic shared by HMO's, is that of utilization 
review. More simply put, the PPO management reviews the 
services provided by its contracted physicians to ascertain 
if the virtues of efficiency were practised. If a doctor 
fails to minimize costs, he will be warned and eventually 
dropped from the provider panel if he fails to take heed. 
The last, and least significant characteristic of PPO's is 
the rapid pace at which they settle claims. Of concern 
probably only to doctors, the efficient manner in which 
most PPO's are organized allows for swift processing and 
billing. On the most basic level, PPO's are modified 
insurance companies which simply act as middle men in 
forming service contract between provider and patient. In 
contrast, an HMO can be described as a provider within 
itself as it employees doctors and actually acts to 
organize the health care product for use by the member.
Medi-Cal
Before moving on to discuss the applicability of the HMO
and PPO to the solution of the four previously stated 
health care dilemmas, it may beneficial to highlight the 
development and implementation of HMO's and PPO's in 
California which has been a leader in this field.
Throughout the late 1970's and early 1980's, California 
suffered throvgh a severe health care crisis. Medical 
costs rose at such an alarming rate that the lower income 
groups had a hard time paying their ever-increasing 
insurance premiums. Moreover these sky-rocketing costs 
were putting severe strains on the state Medicaid plan. 
Therefore, in 1982 California enacted legislation that 
enabled health care purchasers, such as private insurers 
and the state Medicaid plan, to negotiate contracts for the 
provision of health care to their respective beneficiaries 
(63). Thus as PPO's were allowed to negotiate with health 
care providers, new forces were brought to bear on the 
health care market. The two major implementors of this 
legislation were the PPO's and the state Medicaid plan, 
better known as Medi-Cal.
Perhaps most significant were the steps taken oy Medi- 
Cal in revolutionizing government provision of health care. 
Medi-Cal approached its problems on two fronts: first it 
took advantage of the 1982 legislation and organized itself 
into one giant PPO. Secondly, it created incentives for
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California based HMO's to actively recruit Medi-Cal 
eligible members to be sponsored by Medi-Cal itself.
By organizing itself into a "giant PPOM, Medi-Cal 
transformed itself from a passive consumer into an active 
participant in the health care market. In contrast to the 
past, when Medi-Cal simply swallowed the inflated charges 
of hospitals and physicians, Medi-Cal, by virtue of of its 
large enrollment, could force medical care providers to do 
business on its terms. Not surprisingly, once Medi-Cal 
began its negotiations for medical care contracts, most 
hospitals succumbed to the need of Medi-Cal's patronage; by 
1983 seventy-two percent of all California hospitals were 
participating in the contracting process and sixty-seven 
percent had been awarded contracts (63). The remarkable 
success of this program is illustrated in Medi-Cal's 
obtaining, on average, twelve percent discounts in 1984 
over 1983 rates (64). Many critics charged that Medi-Cal's 
strategy would greatly reduce the quality of health care 
available to its patients but the initial results show 
otherwise. A study completed in 1985 found that due to the 
wide dispersion of Medi-Cal contracted providers, there was 
no measurable reduction in access to health care.
Moreover, the actual quality of care available to Medi-Cal 
patients also remained stable (65). So what accounted for
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the hospitals ability to cut fees by twelve percent ? 
Basically the twelve percent cut in fees was compensated 
for by efficiency measures such as increasing occupancy 
rates from a state average of sixty percent in 1983 to a 
more practical seventy percent in 1984 (66).
The second approach adopted by Medi-Cal, farming out 
Medicaid contracts to HMO's, is clearly the most 
revolutionary of the two tactics. What it did was to offer 
reater than normal premiums to HMO's to compensate for the 
greater costs associated with caring for the poor. The 
program was successful in that the proportion of eligible 
Medi-Cal patients actually receiving regular medical care 
significantly increased (67). Moreover, since Medi-Cal 
only had to pay the recipient's yearly premium, its 
administrative costs associated with processing medical 
bills were substantially reduced. The plan was not without 
its defects, however. Medi-Cal investigators found that 
the HMO's were selectively enrolling only the healthier 
Medi-Cal recipients, thus attempting to reduce costs 
associated with treating Medi-Cal patients. Furthermore, 
there a few documented cases of HMO's reducing services to 
Medi-Cal clients. These problems seem to have resulted 
from a lack of governmental oversight rather than an 
inherently flawed program.
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Although the 1982 legislation provided the same 
incentives to private PPO's as it did to Medi-Cal, the 
private firms were less enthusiastic in negotiating 
contracts during the first year. The slowness with which 
the PPO's initially grew was most likely due to the 
provider's reluctance to accept the new arrangement.
Whereas Medi-Cal comprised a large proportion of demand for 
health care, it possessed near monopsony power in 
negotiating with the various health care providers.
Private PPO entry into the market was hindered because few 
PPO's had large enough memberships to either entice or 
intimidate physicians and hospitals into taking part in the 
plan. Despite theso aforementioned barriers and those put 
up by consumers who were wary of PPO safeguards, PPO's 
eventually achieved success comparable to that enjoyed by 
the Medi-Cal program. After a PPO managed to win over a 
hospital or medical practice, the other providers soon fell 
in quick succession so as to avoid losing patients to more 
flexible competitors. In this manner, PPO's slowly 
"conquered11 California, community by community. Thus, by 
1985 Blue Cross PPO had contacted with nearly one hundred 
and fifty hospitals and nine thousand physicians while 
enlisting one million Californian members (68).
Furthermore, as in the Medi-Cal study, the quality of the
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medical service was demonstrated to be as high as it had 
been before the 1982 legislation had been enacted. Even 
more, PPO members were paying ten to twenty percent less in 
1985 for medical services than they had in 1982, purchasing 
these services through the traditional avenue (69).
Despite the potential for radical medical reform in 
California's health care base, that state, like all other 
states, is still troubled by deep-seeded flaws in its 
health care system. Is the HMO/PPO the salvation of our 
health care system or is it just a passing fad ? By 
analyzing the benefits that the HMO/PPO has to offer with 
regard to each of the previously mentioned health care 
problems, we will be able to determine in which areas and 
to what extent HMO/PPO's present a solution to our health 
care woes. (For brevity's sake "HMO/PPO*1 will be shortened 
to simply "HMO")
HMQ' a;. east cgntalnrcent
The first criteria by which the HMO is to be measured 
is that of cost containment. HMO's were designed with the 
primary goal of cost containment in mind, and therefore, as 
perhaps their most appropriate application, will be 
analyzed first.
Most obvious and most beneficial are the operational 
efficiency characteristics of the HMO. First and foremost
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among these characteristics is the HMO's emphasis on cost- 
benefit analysis. HMO managers carefully review medical 
services provided by HMO physicians to insure that all 
costs are legitimate and not unnecessary use of medicine or 
equipment. HMO managers are not trying to deprive members 
access to the latest med-tech analysis, only trying to 
eliminate medical school habits of over-reliance on 
expensive diagnostic equipment without adequately judging 
its true necessity.
The second cost cutting advantage of HMO's is that by 
guaranteeing physicians and medical centers of a certain 
volume of patients, it enables both to cut down on excess 
capacity. Whereas physicians and especially hospitals were 
always faced with an uncertain demand curve- uncertain both 
in the quantity of service demanded and uncertain in the 
demographics of those demanding the service- HMO's allow 
health care providers to be more confident in the numbers 
and types of patients that they are likely to be treating. 
Moreover, while excess capacity and bed space were costs 
passed on to consumers to help '•guarantee" hospitals the 
ability to meet unpredictable types and levels of demand, 
HMO's, by insuring hospitals of a given demand, allow 
hospitals to tailor their supply to more neatly fit the 
consumer's demand. Thus, HMO's act as "medical
62
wholesalers1 trading patient volume for discounted medical 
fees.
A third and not unrelated feature of HMO's that 
augments their ability to restrict cost increases is the 
apparent economies of scale that derive to the medium and 
large HMO's. The traditional method by which rival 
hospitals would compete against one and another was through 
quality competition. Rather than using price incentives or 
advertisements to attract clients, they would attempt to 
develop specialized care facilities that were superior to 
their rival's. Such rivalry led to the overabundance of 
relatively little used equipment like radiology labs, 
chemotherapy units, and CAT scan machines. HMO's, by the 
simple fact that they link together networks of doctors and 
hospitals, can greatly reduce such economic waste. Thus, 
if an HMO network consists of two hospitals in a given 
city, there is no need for both facilities to duplicate 
specialized capital; rather one could concentrate in a 
designated field such as pre-natal care, while the other 
invests in an intensive coronary care unit. In this 
manner, both hospitals would maintain a satisfactory share 
of patients yet there would be less waste of medical 
resources. Even more, general practioners, via their 
affiliation to the HMO could share costly X-ray equipment
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and lab facilities, and further reduce costs. Therefore, 
because of their large client membership and their ability 
to link physicians and facilities* together into efficient 
networks, HMO's are able to generate higher returns on 
their capital investments.
Although as demonstrated, HMO's have many features 
that make them inherently more efficient than their 
traditional rivals, HMO's can actually improve the cost 
containment practices of their traditionally organized 
rivals. By introducing price competition into the health 
care market, HMO's can cause non-participating (non-HMO) 
providers to reform their fee structure without actually 
forcing them to merge with an HMO. The injection of price 
competition presents with three choices: sustain a 
significant decrease in patient volume, merge with an HMO, 
or reform their fee schedule so as to bring provider fees 
into line with the prevailing market rate. Despite the 
difficulties experienced by many hospitals and group 
practices in obtaining voluntary fee reductions, most 
hospitals have been able to adjust their rates to at least 
some extent. This reasoning is supported by the fact that 
although HMO's compose only ten to fifteen percent of the 
health are market, the rate of health care expenditure 
increases fell nationally by an average of twenty percent
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from 1982 to 1985 as a result of national legislation that 
for the first time effectively gave incentives to HMO 
formation (70) . Furthermore, California, a state v/ith 
higher than average HMO concentration, witnessed a fifty 
percent decrease in medical expenditure inflation after the 
first year of its 1982 HMO legislation (71). Clearly, not 
only do HMO's have characteristics that make them more 
efficient than their rivals, but HMO's, because they inject 
price competition into the market, create a strong 
incentive for transitional providers to minimize costs.
Of course the cost containment criticism of HMO's is 
not without its critics. The first and most pronounced 
criticism of this policy is that Americans may well not 
want to reduce health care expenditures. Today's society 
may value health care at an increasing rate equal to the 
growth of health care costs. Undeniably, Americans are 
more health conscious today than ever before. Moreover, as 
new medical tests and services have been developed, 
Americans have welcomed their arrival. Although these 
assumptions may very well be true, however, it is still 
necessary to put these choices back into the consumers 
hands and not just to assume that the health care 
profession is capable of determining what the consumer 
wants. Thus, while it is easy to believe that Americans
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place a high value on medical care, it is equally difficult 
to believe that they truly value it to such an extent that 
it should absorb in excess of ten percent of the GNF. The 
idea of cost containment therefore, is not to arbitrarily 
restrict health care expenditures, but to project cost- 
benefit analysis into the resource allocation process.
A second and more accurate complaint leveled against 
HMO's as vehicles of cost containment is that they aren't 
capable of restricting price increases on their own. This 
criticism is also a complaint voiced by HMO proponents who 
claim critics judge HMO's too harshly. The truth is that 
alone, HMO's are not yet numerous enough or powerful enough 
to single-handedly hold down expenditure increases. Even 
if they did compose a large share of the health care 
supply, it is doubtful that they would possess the power, 
both economic and political, to do so. The decision to 
slow medical expenditure increases must be made by the 
people and carried out in the form of consumer 
participation and government legislation; HMO's can only be 
one tool toward this end.
Yet another complaint leveled against HMO's, one with 
more serious ramifications, is the criticism that 
competition among HMO's could drive some firms to such 
financial straits as to necessitate significant reductions
6 6
in the quality of medical care provided. Critics fear that 
just as unrestricted price competition has reduced air 
travel to an adventure in survival, so too will it pose a 
threat to the health of potential patients. Although most 
HMO's have the foresight to realize that unnecessary risks 
reduced membership and costly malpractice suits, a few 
unethical HMO managers might be inclined to cut corners in 
order to earn short run profits. To prevent such 
occurrences, an effective monitoring agency should be 
developed following federal guidelines to foster uniformity 
but administered on the state level as such a project would 
most effectively be carried out by local agencies. These 
agencies could periodically inspect HMO's to insure that 
medical standards were not being sacrificed in favor of 
profits. Thus, even though it is probably safe to say that 
quality decline is not likely to be an industry-wide 
problem- as research evidence has proven- it may be 
necessary to create a regulatory agency, federally 
structured but locally administered, to assure that 
standards of quality are respected by all licensed HMO's.
HMO; QSJCSL £oor
Government involvement becomes even more important 
when evaluating HMO's on their ability to meet the second
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of the four problem criteria, providing care for the poor. 
In this field, the HMO holds perhaps one of the brightest 
hopes. While one of this country's most lamentable 
problems, the health condition of the poor could be greatly 
improved if the HMO was utilized as the government tool for 
delivering health care to the poor. The advantages of the 
HMO stem from its ability to smoothly bring the poor into 
the health system used by the rest of the United States.
The first of these advantages is the ability of HMO's 
to bring eligible Medicaid recipients into the actual 
health care system. Although all Medicaid recipients are 
obviously eligible for government reimbursed health care, 
some percentage well over fifteen percent of the Medicaid 
population has no regular access to health care system 
(72). Given adequate incentives by the federal government, 
HMO's could greatly increase the participation of Medicaid 
recipients in the health care system. They could do so by 
utilizing the already well organized advertising 
departments to go out and seek Medicaid enrollees. On the 
local level, HMO's have vastly greater manpower resources 
to insure Medicaid participants have access to the medical 
system than does the federal or state governments. Thus in 
1985, Congress amended the contents of the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 to provide incentives for
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HMO's to enroll Medicare members. The incentives included 
government agreement to reimburse HMO's on a capitation 
basis and recognition that Medicare patients incur higher 
than average medical costs. The first incentive involved 
the government's willingness to reimburse HMO's on a 
capitation basis, a yearly premium arrangement, rather than 
on a per case method. It was inefficient for HMO's to 
operate a billing department simply to care for Medicare 
patients when all other patients were billed on a yearly 
premium basis. Moreover, by allowing HMO's a larger 
capitation rate for Medicare patients on an at-risk basis, 
the government made serving Medicare patients a profitable 
venture. (An at-risk basis is one in which the government 
gives the HMO a fixed amount of money to cover the 
patient's medical expenses; if the HMO spends more than 
that amount it loses money, if it spends less than that 
amount it can keep the difference in the form of profits.) 
Within a few years of its implementation, this act brought 
the Medicare enrollment in HMO's from four percent in 1982 
to eleven and a half percent in 1985 (72). Although this 
act affected only the low income elderly, a similar plan 
could easily be enacted and implemented to drastically 
increase the Medicaid enrollment in HMO's. As for the 
millions of "working poor", HMO's could not act to help
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these people unless state or federal officials pass 
legislation, such as the Kennedy bill, widening Medicaid 
coverage to include this group.
A second advantage of government enrollment of 
Medicaid patients would be to solve the problem of 
inequality in medical care. At present, a large percentage 
of the poor receive medical care in public clinics and 
hospital outpatient facilities while most of the rest of 
America receives medical care in physicians' offices. Not 
only is the second type of treatment more desirable, it is 
also of a higher quality. In the California case, Medi-Cal 
patients were enrolled in HMO's used by the rest of the 
population. No HMO's took on exclusively Medi-Cal 
patients, instead each participating HMO enrolled a mix of 
patients to create an optimal utilization of its 
facilities. Thus, by enlisting welfare recipients in 
HMO's, the government would in effect be merging the poor 
into a medical system shared equally by all. Not only 
would better medical care benefit the poor, but would also 
lead to a better overall level of health as the poor are 
ill-famed for spreading society's most dreaded diseases. 
Lastly, this level of medical equality for low income 
patients is unlikely to cost the taxpayer because HMO's are 
not only more efficient than most public clinics, but
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recent evidence shows that overstatement of Medicaid and 
Medicare charges has cost government approximately two 
hundred million dollars a year (73).
Yet another advantage of HMO enrollment of welfare 
recipients derives from the fact that HMO's make easy tools 
for policy implementation. Whereas now there is no simple 
channel that government could utilize to quickly and 
effectively implement policy concerning Medicaid or 
Medicare patients, if all welfare patients were enrolled in 
HMO'3 the process could be greatly simplified and 
expedited. Because all HMO's must be licensed, they are 
easily identifiable and accessible to government policy. 
Moreover, as HMO's are tightly and efficiently organized, 
they could be readily utilized as an effective means of 
implementing policy goals without fear of objectives being 
lost in the bureaucratic quagmire that plagues many 
hospitals. Clearly then, HMO's could prove to be 
efficient vehicles of Medicaid policy by virtue of their 
easy accessibility and streamlined administrative 
structure. On a somewhat different angle, HMO service of 
welfare patients could well benefit the rest of society 
financially. As was previously discussed, all public and 
many private hospitals serve patients who are in dire need 
regardless of their ability to pay. As a result, these
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hospitals must pick up the tab of various poor people who 
either aren't eligible for Medicaid or haven't been signed 
up. Furthermore, these hospitals discover that in numerous 
cases they lose money on Medicaid patients because their 
forms were either lost or never sent in to the government. 
These costs are not simply absorbed by the hospital, but 
are either passed on in the form of higher fees for paying 
customers, as is the case of private hospitals, or in the 
form of higher taxes, as is the case of public hospitals.
By removing the poor from this unenviable position and 
actively enrolling them in HMO's, where their costs can be 
paid by the government rather than by other consumers, the 
burden of financing health care for the poor is at least 
shifted to the appropriate bearer. This distinction is 
important, for as long as care of the poor is subsidized by 
medical payments of the middle and upper income classes, it 
remains an externality and is therefore not receiving the 
attention or resources a problem of its nature truly 
requires for satisfactory resolution.
The problems associated with instituting a federally 
sponsored program of enrolling Medicaid/Medicare recipients 
are nonetheless several and potentially serious. The first 
problem involves the extra tax burden such a program is 
likely to cause. Although the per capita cost of providing
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for welfare patients is not likely to rise significantly, 
such a program of encouraged enrollment is likely to 
increase the number of patients being sponsored by the 
government. Despite the fact that this added revenue 
burden is not a direct consequence of the proposed shift to 
HMO enrollment of the indigent, it still remains an 
obstacle to the development of such a plan. The gravity of 
the problem becomes more clear when one considers that 
state governments spend several hundred dollars for each 
Medicaid patient. To institute a program on the state or 
federal level that causes incentives such as the 1982 TEFRA 
legislation, could bring several million additional active 
participants in the Medicaid program. Not only will the 
aggressive recruitment tactics of HMO's result in 
additional Medicaid clients, but the promise of quality 
medical care will also draw some people that were not 
motivated to participate in Medicaid in the past.
Undeniably, this is a question not of the potential 
effectiveness of HMO's in this function, but rather, 
whether or not the country is capable and willing to 
allocate substantially greater resources to the care of the 
indigent- a question that can only be answered by heated 
debate in the U.S. Congress.
Another obstacle likely to forestall speedy enactment
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of indigent HMO legislation is the problem in guaranteeing 
the Medicaid patients are treated fairly and equitably by 
HMO's. Ideally all HMO's would treat their Medicaid 
clients like any paying-clients. However, Medi-Cal 
experience has illustrated that reality is often unrelated 
to theory. In the Medi-Cal experiment, HMO's tried to cut 
costs by only enrolling the healthiest Medi-Cal clients, 
provided levels of care that were substandard, and 
terminated patients that demonstrated sickly trends. The 
only solution to this problem, and the one eventually 
adopted by Medi-Cal, is to create a government oversight 
commission to monitor participating HMO's to insure good- 
faith execution of contractual obligations. In addition to 
this regulatory agency, an ombudsman could be appointed to 
open channels of communication for Medicaid patients to 
voice their complaints against the system. No matter what 
regulatory structure is employed, it is obvious that there 
is a need to protect the rights of the poor from those who 
would exploit them.
HMQlfti Catastrophic Health Care Costs 
A third dilemma plaguing the health care system is the 
phenomena of catastrophic health care costs. As mentioned 
earlier, catastrophic health care costs are not defined by
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some fixed dollar value, but are variable and relative to a 
person's income or ability to pay. Thus, for example, 
medical expenses exceeding twenty percent of income might 
be considered might be considered to inflict "catastrophic" 
expenditures on his/her financial resources. By this 
measure, HMO's are among a choice of alternatives proposed 
to alleviate the problem. The ideal solution is to develop 
an insurance plan that has a very low deductible and covers 
almost all medical costs. Many traditional comprehensive 
insurances policies strive toward this ideal. The HMO 
might be the best solution available, however, as it has 
many exclusive features that enable it to react most 
efficiently to potentially expensive operations. From the 
consumer's standpoint, once the yearly premium is paid, all 
medical services are free of charge with the exception of 
very minimal charges for prescription medicine. This very 
low patient charge threshold is very attractive in that it 
guarantees that no one will suffer potentially severe 
financial problems as a result of medical bills. Secondly, 
while even the most comprehensive insurance plans pay out 
only a maximum reimbursement value, HMO coverage is based 
on time not money. Furthermore, there are some operations 
that are so rare and expensive that most insurance programs 
will not cover them. Therefore, there may be some
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operations that are so costly that they become potentially 
catastrophic regardless of the conventional insurance 
policy held. From an HMO standpoint, one can see how HMO's 
are able to provide this MunconditionalM health coverage. 
Because HMO's have a large membership base and because they 
collect annual premiums rather than per service payments, 
they must allocate funds to provide their doctors and 
individual must be a member of a family that has an income 
that is classified as being below the poverty line. 
Furthermore, one-half of the states exclude two parent 
families from eligibility, while all states require that at 
least one parent be unemployed. Not only do these 
requirements exclude many families, but they also provide 
hospitals with resources to meet all the needs, both the 
normal and the extreme, that an average population is 
expected to develop over a year. Moreover, as all 
employees of the HMO, including the physicians are salaried 
rather than being paid on a fee-for-service basis, it costs 
the HMO the same regardless of what operations its surgeons 
perform. Thus, as far as the HMO is concerned, the 
patients medical costs are taken care of once the yearly 
fee has been paid. The distinction between HMO's and 
comprehensive insurance plans, therefore, res~s on the fact 
that HMO's have direct control over the medical resources
needed for service while the private insurer must contract 
out for these services on a fee-for-service basis. (In 
this aspect, HMO's are superior to PPO's because PPO's 
contract for physicians services in a manner not 
unlike that of private insurers.) In summation, because of 
tneir organizational innovations, HMO's are perhaps best 
suited to reduce the threat of financially catastrophic 
medical care costs.
The role of HMO's in restricting financially 
catastrophic medical is not without limitation, however.
The first and most apparent barrier is the yearly premium. 
For many, the HMO premium is paid by their employer as 
fringe benefit, but for the poor a yearly premium of 
several hundred to a few thousand dollars may be 
prohibitive indeed. Unfortunately, the nature of the HMO 
requires that all member pay a fixed fee that will support 
the HMO in its yearly operations. Once again however, the 
flaw is not necessarily of the HMO's making, rather it is 
one that could readily be cured if state and local 
government acted to subsidize the poor in their endeavor of 
seeking financial security from medical costs. Until such 
actions are taken, however, the HMO premium may act as a 
barrier preventing the lowest income classes from obtaining 
protection from financially catastrophic medical
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expenditures.
HMO's: Long Tgrm Health gaxe £o£ tte Elderly 
The last problem criteria, long term health care, is a 
topic just being explored by the HMO field. As previously 
argued, the present system of long term health care, 
principally Medicaid reimbursement of nursing home care, is 
undesirable both from the standpoint of the recipient's 
"spending down" to qualify for Medicaid and from the 
standpoint of the poor and sometimes unhealthy conditions 
found in too many nursing homes. An alternative system, 
one not fully developed yet, could be the Social HMO. 
Technically, the Social HMO "is a managed system of health 
and long term care services. Under this model a single 
provider entity assumes responsibility for a full range of 
personal care services under a fixed premium that is 
prospectively determined." (74). The Social HMO has the 
advantage that it coordinates all the health services 
needed by the member. Thus, the S/HMO will either provide 
or arrange the provision of any health care service needed. 
Moreover, the S/HMO, because it can effectively "pool" the 
risk of a great number of members, can hold down costs. 
Therefore, the premiums are estimated to range from five 
thousand to twelve thousand dollars a year.
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There are several flaws in S/HMO's that reduce their 
potential feasibility. Most importantly, the four 
experimental S/HMO's presently offer limited services. 
Although they all guarantee the provision of all health 
services, many services, such as nursing home care must be 
paid for by the member. As there are presently only four 
experimental S/HMO's under government supervision (based in 
Portland, Oregon; Brooklyn, New York; Minneapolis, 
Minnesota; and Long Beach, California), it is difficult to 
gauge how serious this problem is. Secondly, S/HMO's do 
not resolve the problem of financing care before 
retirement. More clearly, S/HMO's require a yearly premium 
but many elderly, believing that Medicare covers long term 
care, fail to save sufficient funds to pay for such 
premiums. What is needed, therefore, is a system by which 
people can pay for long term care far in advance of old 
age. Lastly, as S/HMO's are community-based, there is no 
way for a member to take benefits with him if he decides to 
move to another part of the country.
Although there are several serious problems with 
S/HMO's, it is too early to make a decision regarding their 
relative benefits. The four government sponsored S/HMO's, 
the only existing S/HMO's, were created in 1986 and are 
guaranteed sponsorship until 1991. No studies have been
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done on their potential feasibility; the first expected to 
be completed in 1990 (75). Thus, despite several potential 
flaws, S/HMO's do offer hope that an effective alternative 
to the present long term health care system may soon be 
developed.
gonglysign
In summation, it can be seen that while HMO's are not 
a cure-all solution to America's health care problems, they 
can be used as a tool of government policy for more 
effectively achieving its goals. In the realm of cost 
containment, HMO's have proven their organizational 
structure gives great incentives for efficient operation. 
Government promotion of HMO's as the preferred mode of 
health care delivery would be at least as successful at 
holding down costs as Certificate-of-Need requirements and 
Prospective Reimbursement. Furthermore, the ability of 
HMO's to "pool" risk of a given population group and to 
provide comprehensive health care ideally suites them to 
caring for the Medicare and Medicaid populations. The 
present system of caring for the poor and the elderly is an 
ad hoc mish-mash, split between federal and state agencies, 
which fails miserably to provide any uniformity in policy 
implementation. By utilizing HMO's as units for providing
health care, government could more easily control policy 
implementation and uniformity. Lastly, long term health 
care is a puzzle which at the present time neither the 
public or private sectors seems capable of solving.
Nursing home care financed by Medicaid is a scary 
proposition, while Social HMO's remain a big question mark. 
It is clear that HMO's will play a role in the future; to 
what extent and how effectively they will be integrated 
into government policy depend on Congress's commitment to 
solving America's health care woes and its willingness to 
use new and innovative tools in implementing that policy.
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